There is a general consensus among scholars and policy analysts that global antiAmerican sentiment has been on the rise in the first decades of the 21st century (Ceaser, 2004; Chiozza, 2009; Lacorne & Judt, 2005; Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007; Krastev, 2007; Singh, 2006; Zakaria, 2004) . The phenomenon of anti-Americanism, however, has a history of more than 200 years. A historical account by O'Connor (2006) shows that, among European intellectuals in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, there was a tendency of "cultural criticism of the lack of taste, grace and civility in American habits and everyday life" (p. 13).
Signs of similar anti-American sentiments can be found in Europe till the present time (Markovits, 2007) , but the nature of anti-Americanism changed dramatically throughout the 20th century, parallel to the increase of the U.S. role in the international politics. Criticism of America became global and its focus shifted to economics and politics, or-more preciselyto those economic and political practices associated with the U.S. and Americans.
There is a debate in the literature regarding the exact meaning of the term "antiAmericanism." There are contributions that employ a relatively narrow definition of antiAmericanism as an "obsession" based on the demonization of the U.S. and Americans (Berman, 2004; Hollander, 1995 Hollander, , 2009 O'Connor & Griffiths, 2006) . Throughout the present paper, the term "anti-Americanism" is used in its most general sense in order to denote the general phenomenon of "opposition or hostility to the people or the government policies of the United States" (Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 2003, p. 54) .
Popular anti-Americanism can be an important factor in international politics for at least two reasons. First, the spread of anti-American sentiments can create a social climate favourable to anti-American violence and activities of extremist organizations (Hollander, 2009 ). Moghaddam (2005) argues that hostility to Americans based on unquestioned attribution of responsibility for all the negative processes in world politics to the U.S.
represents an important stage in the "staircase to terrorism." Second, growth of popular antiAmericanism threatens American "soft power," a term coined by Nye (1990) in order to describe America's ability to convince rather than to coerce and its attractiveness to the populations of other countries. Thus, anti-Americanism can jeopardize both the legitimacy of U.S. leadership and the efficiency of its foreign policy by hindering international cooperation (Chiozza, 2009; Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007; Naim, 2003) . Zakaria (2004) suggests that such a situation would be dangerous for the whole international community, as American efforts still constitute a cornerstone of contemporary global security. This paper aims to contribute to the ongoing theoretical debate on the nature of antiAmericanism and its causes in three major ways. First, most existing research on anti-Americanism is represented by either case-studies or theoretical contributions, whereas comparative (Yeo, 2010) and quantitative works (Blaydes & Linzer, 2012; Chiozza, 2009 ) are relatively scarce. This study will use quantitative methods, namely factor and regression analysis, and country-level data collected by research centres and international organizations in order to address the phenomenon of anti-Americanism from a comparative perspective.
Most importantly, it is shown that anti-Americanism on the national level is significantly related to both socioeconomic development and cultural heritage. This finding supports the idea that anti-Americanism in various regions of the world is partially caused by the common factors which should be studied using the means of comparative analysis. Second, although contributions on anti-Americanism often suggest that general hostility to America should be distinguished from issue-specific criticisms of the U.S. (Kane, 2006; Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007; Singh, 2006) , this distinction was not sufficiently explored. This paper's findings indicate that-at least on the national level-there is clear empirical distinction between cultural and political anti-Americanism. Third, anti-Americanism in the Middle East and wider Muslim world draws attention of scholars (Abdallah, 2003; Chiddick, 2006; Lynch, 2007; Makdisi, 2002) , but the premise that Islamic societies are on average more antiAmerican has never been explicitly tested. The analysis reveals that anti-Americanism is indeed more widespread in Muslim societies than in non-Muslim ones, but further research is necessary in order to understand nature of this phenomenon.
Universal Roots of Anti-Americanism
Before speaking about possible driving forces behind anti-American sentiments it is necessary to make a fundamental distinction between country-specific and more global ones.
The former are usually researched in the format of case-studies devoted to particular countries and/or regions. There are contributions on the origins and development of anti-American sentiments in the Middle East (Lynch, 2007) , Latin America (McPherson, 2007) , Europe (Berman, 2004) , and even in the U.S. itself (Hollander, 1995) . This approach is based on the assumption that anti-Americanism is mostly fuelled by factors which cannot be separated from the historical and political context of a particular society.
The present study employs the opposite assumption, namely that anti-American sentiments in different parts of the world have important commonalities. More specifically, I
suggest that anti-Americanism can be seen as a manifestation of a relatively old phenomenon related to resentment against modernity. Such an approach can be found in theoretical and historical contributions on anti-Americanism. Ceaser (2004) states that anti-Americanism appeared in Europe as a reaction towards the Enlightenment and other developments related to the modern era, such as industrialization and the growth of individualism. Rubin and Rubin (2004) argue that, since the 19th century, in the eyes of European intellectuals America began to symbolize all the negative features of modernity, such as industrial deformation of living space, rootless cosmopolitanism, and absence of elitism. Contemporary antiAmericanism, according to Berman (2004) , is a form of critique directed against the processes of globalization, which promotes a neoliberal economic model and cultural unification. Ajami (2003) provided possibly the best formulation of this thesis: "To come bearing modernism to those who want it but who rail against it at the same time, to represent and embody so much of what the world yearns for and fears-that is the American burden" (p.
58).
The same view on anti-American and wider anti-Western sentiments, though on the higher level of abstraction, is developed in the contribution by Buruma and Margalit (2005) .
They view anti-Westernism-or "Occidentalism" as they call it-as a universal resentment against modern civilization which is defined through "the dehumanizing picture of the West painted by its enemies" (p. 5). This image is based on stereotypization and denigration:
Within an Occidentalist myth the West is depicted it as a mechanistic civilization which lacks spiritual culture, inspiration, and heroism. It is interesting that specific targets of Occidentalist abhorrence-cosmopolitan cities, selfish bourgeoisie, and immoral sciencecorrespond quite well to the crucial processes of social transformation such as urbanization, industrialization, and secularization (see Inglehart, 1997) . The relationship between Occidentalism and anti-Americanism is not straightforward, as the former can be directed against other groups -for example, Jews have a long history of being an object of similar hatred. At the same time existence of remarkable similarities between anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism (see Markovits, 2007) indirectly supports the idea that mass anti-American sentiments involve deeper psychological mechanisms than simple disagreement with the U.S. government. Accordingly, the analysis by Buruma and Margalit suggests that antiAmericanism should be understood as a contemporary vessel for old venom brewed of intolerance and inability to accept modernity.
Variety of Anti-American Sentiments
The assumption that anti-Americanism is related to rejection of modernity by no means refers to any possible disagreements with the U.S. foreign policy or distastes of certain aspects of American society, since they can often be justified (Hollander, 1995 (Hollander, , 2009 Markovits, 2007; O'Connor & Griffiths, 2006) . Therefore, a general distinction can be made between issue-oriented criticism of the U.S., which involves opposition to certain policies and/or practices, and general hostility towards Americans (Lacorne & Judt, 2005) . This separation was employed, for instance, in the empirical study by Chiozza (2009) in order to construct issue-specific indices of anti-Americanism. However, the assumption that rational and irrational motives of anti-American sentiments can be grouped into two coherent measures was not explicitly tested. So, the first hypothesis of the present study is that there is an empirical distinction between cultural and political anti-Americanism on the national level (H1). If this assumption holds, then only the former can be interpreted as a psychological reaction to modernization, while the latter should be treated as a political position.
Anti-Americanism and Socioeconomic Development
If anti-Americanism in different parts of the world represents manifestation of the same psychological reaction to the processes of modernization, it is reasonable to suggest that level of anti-Americanism in a society should be related to its socioeconomic development.
There are, however, different predictions regarding the direction of such relationship. A first type of logic linking anti-Americanism and socioeconomic development can be derived from the revised version of modernization theory proposed by Inglehart (1997) . The theory is built on the assumption that technological progress and economic development create a social climate of "existential security" which includes guaranteed physical survival and increased control over one's own life. Existential security, in turn, leads to a number of predictable changes in both values and institutions, and the most important of them is spread of tolerance and, as a result, emergence of stable liberal democracies (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005) .
Modernization theory does not directly address the phenomenon of anti-Americanism but-if the latter is fuelled by intolerance and anti-modernist resentment-existential security is expected to undermine the psychological basis for anti-Americanism. Therefore, it can be hypothesized that the spread of cultural anti-Americanism is negatively related to socioeconomic development on the national level (H2), whereas this is not necessarily true for political anti-Americanism.
An alternative mechanism which connects anti-Americanism and modernization can be found in a historical analysis by Greenfeld (1992) . She uses French word ressentiment in order to refer to a specific form of nationalism which emerges in the countries having undergone a processes of deep social transformation. Using examples of Russia and Germany in the 18th and 19th centuries, Greenfeld shows that most projects of "catch-up modernization" have two important similarities. First, they are oriented towards some model, usually a leading country of the time, which is widely perceived as an ideal modern societyin the narrative by Greenfeld, this role is played by France and Britain. Second, admiration for the model is easily replaced with envy and hatred-the constituent feelings of ressentiment-if modernization does not go as successfully as initially anticipated. This logic explains why nowadays America has become a target of such intense hatred: The U.S. is admired and loathed because, being a global leader, it is often seen as the perfect embodiment of Western modernity. Greenfeld's theory was never designed for an empirical testing but it clearly suggests that the relationship between modernization and ressentiment is nonlinear. If anti-Americanism can be compared to a "virus," then the least developed countries are not yet infected with it, the most developed ones already recovered, while societies in the middle of modernization process are at highest risk. Therefore, it is possible to formulate an alternative hypothesis that there is a quadratic relationship between anti-American sentiments and socioeconomic development on the national level, so that countries with average levels of socioeconomic development are characterized by the highest levels of anti-Americanism (H2a). As well as for the previous hypothesis, this effect is expected only for cultural antiAmericanism.
Anti-Americanism in Muslim Societies
It is not surprising that the prominence of anti-American sentiments in many Muslim countries, often noticed by both media and academia, draws attention of scholars. Even though most authors agree that the level of anti-Americanism in Muslim regions, and especially in the Middle East, is rather high, various explanations for this phenomenon have been proposed (see Lynch, 2007) . Many of them can be attributed to one of the two major frameworks which view anti-Americanism as respectively either a manifestation of the "clash of civilizations", or a response to American policy towards Muslims. The first approach is usually attributed to Huntington (1996) , but Bernard Lewis proposed one of its earliest formulations in the classic essay "The Roots of Muslim Rage". According to Lewis (1990 Lewis ( /2001 , anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism among Muslims "goes beyond hostility to specific interests or actions or policies or even countries and becomes a rejection of Western civilization as such" (p. 18). An alternative logic links anti-American sentiments in the Muslim world to anger at the U.S. policies, including alliance with Israel, military actions against Muslim countries, and hypocrisy in support for the democratic principles (Abdallah, 2003; Chiddick, 2006; Makdisi, 2002) .
The present study seeks to escape this debate and to test instead whether the level of anti-Americanism in Muslim societies can be attributed to certain social and political institutions. One such argument is put forward by modernization theory: Inglehart and Norris (2002) claim that the key gap between Muslim and Western societies concerns not politics but social values, most importantly gender equality and sexual morals. From a social psychological perspective, the spread of Western cultural models is driven by the processes of globalization, which threatens Islamic identity and thus provokes resentment among the Muslim populations (Moghaddam, 2008) . This anger is transferred to the U.S. which -due to its unrivalled position in world politics -is seen as the source of perceived cultural expansion.
In other words, anti-Americanism in Muslim societies basically represents a form of fundamentalist resistance to cultural globalization described by Giddens (2002) Another possible factor of anti-Americanism in the Islamic world, which is nevertheless often neglected, concerns internal political processes in Muslim societies (see Blaydes & Linzer, 2012) . Analyzing political history of the Middle East after the breakdown of Western colonial rule, Lewis (2004) finds that instead of improving the quality of administration, political modernization strengthened authoritarian governments in the region, as the latter borrowed Western technologies of oppression and propaganda in order to secure their power. Influence over media can be very important, as Gentzkow and Shapiro (2004) show that exposure to certain broadcasters is significantly related to the levels of antiAmericanism.
Using state-controlled media and modern forms of indoctrination, authoritarian regimes in Muslim countries channel the frustration of their populations towards external targets, such as the U.S. and Israel (Moghaddam, 2005 4 Second, we used a measure of a country's dependency on oil and gas rent measured as the share of fuel in exports (see Ross, 2001 ).
These data were taken from the World Bank website. 
Results

Factor analysis
An exploratory factor model was run as a first step of the empirical analysis in order to understand the patterns of distribution of different anti-American opinions on the national level; the results are represented in Table 3 . The findings give strong support for my first hypotheses as they show that there is a clear distinction between cultural and political antiAmericanism (H1 corroborated). The first one, which I refer to as "cultural antiAmericanism", consists of negative attitudes to American culture and its global spread. The second type, "political anti-Americanism," includes negative evaluations of some aspects of the U.S. foreign policy, namely hypocrisy in promotion of democracy, unilateralism, and indifference to global economic inequality.
< Table 3 
Regression Analysis
In this part of the empirical analysis, two independent series of regressions are estimated with respectively cultural and political anti-Americanism as dependent variables.
The sequence of steps is as follows: estimate the relationship between anti-Americanism and HDI, linear and nonlinear, with controls and then add the percentage of Muslim populations to the model also looking for possible mediating effects. See Table 4 for the descriptive statistics of all variables in the analysis, including constructed indices and their components.
< Table 4 about here > Cultural anti-Americanism. Initial regression model reveals that there is no linear dependency between cultural anti-Americanism and HDI (see Model 1.1 in Table 5 ) thus leading to a rejection of a hypothesis based on modernization theory that anti-American sentiments gradually diminish parallel to socioeconomic development (H2 refuted).
However, a second-order term for HDI shows significant results. This means that cultural anti-Americanism and socioeconomic development are actually connected, but the relationship between them is nonlinear or, more precisely, quadratic. The direction of the coefficient suggests that the effect takes the shape of an "inverted U," so that both the poorest and the richest countries show low levels of cultural anti-Americanism, while societies with middle levels of HDI are more hostile to American culture. Furthermore, the quadratic effect of the HDI explains 39% of cross-national variance in cultural anti-Americanism thus indicating that socioeconomic development represents a major factor in the emergence of anti-American sentiments. This finding fully confirms the alternative hypotheses formulated on the basis of the theory by Greenfeld (H2a corroborated) and makes it possible to suggest that cultural anti-Americanism follows the logic of ressentiment and, therefore, likely represents a psychological reaction, arising in the middle stages of modernization.
Furthermore, the results of the regression analysis indicate that even after the inclusion of measures of economic structure (index of post-industrialization and fuel exports), the quadratic effect of HDI on cultural anti-Americanism remains statistically significant and does not decrease in magnitude. This finding suggests that the roots of hostility towards
American culture in societies with middle levels of socioeconomic development should be attributed not to their social and/or economic structure but rather to a psychological reaction associated with ongoing modernization.
< Table 5 Table   5 ).
Political anti-Americanism. Political anti-Americanism shows a different pattern of relationship to socioeconomic development. There is a strong and significant negative effect of HDI on the level of political anti-Americanism (see Model 2.1 in Table 6 < Table 6 about here > As for the relationship between political anti-Americanism and the percentage of the Muslim population, it appears that Muslim societies score significantly higher than nonMuslim ones on political anti-Americanism (H4 corroborated; see Model 2.2 in Table 6 ).
This finding is not surprising since conventional wisdom suggests that such factors as Table 6 ).
Discussion The Two Forms of Anti-Americanism
The results of the empirical analysis have several important theoretical implications, which are discussed below. societies such as Sweden, France, and Canada. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the distinction between cultural and political anti-Americanism has both internal and external validity. These findings suggest that the debate between the two major approaches to antiAmericanism can be solved by recognition of existence of both culturally and politically motivated anti-American sentiments.
Anti-Americanism and Socioeconomic Development
An important empirical result of the present study reveals the existence of quadratic relationship between cultural anti-Americanism and HDI. Countries characterized by negative attitudes to American culture are ones with the moderate levels of socioeconomic development. This finding indirectly supports the idea that cultural anti-Americanism is more widespread in the societies undergoing the middle stages of modernization compared to countries in which modernization has not begun (the least developed ones) or is already complete (the most developed). This relationship should be interpreted in terms of the ressentiment theory by Greenfeld (1992) . The most important strength of her analysis is the ability to explain paradoxical "love-hate" attitudes to America in many developing countries noticed, for instance, by Ajami (2003) and Moghaddam (2008) . According to Greenfeld, can-and should-be studied using quantitative methods and large-scale comparative design.
Anti-Americanism in Muslim Societies
Unfortunately, the present study did not shed much light on the phenomenon of anti- Certainly there is a temptation to interpret these results as evidence of a civilization clash between Muslims and the West in a definition proposed by Huntington (1996) .
However, there are still alternative explanations contributing to the understanding of antiAmericanism among Muslims and were not directly tested in the present study. First, neoliberal political and economic practices ardently promoted by the U.S. government in the international arena tend to weaken states in developing regions, increase global inequality, and thus provoke anger within disaffected nations (Griffiths, 2006) . Second, antiAmericanism can also be a response to the sense of exceptionalism which is widespread among the American public and contributes to the worldwide image of the U.S. as an arrogant nation (Judt, 2005; Kohut & Stokes, 2006; Stam & Shohat, 2007 'Neil, 2006) , and the perceived American intention to dominate over the rest of the world can represent an important predictor of anti-Americanism (Glick et al., 2006) . Muslims, due to their history and geopolitical position, are simply more sensitive to these issues than people in other regions (Moghaddam, 2008 
Conclusion
The present study addressed different forms of anti-Americanism and patterns of their distribution on the national level using empirical evidence from the 45 societies. The key findings contributing to the ongoing debate on the nature and causes of ant-American sentiments are accounted for below. First, an exploratory factor analysis revealed the existence of the two distinct forms of anti-Americanism -cultural and political, respectively.
The former is based on negative attitudes to American culture and its global spread, whereas the latter involves opposition to certain aspects of U.S. foreign policy, including the forceful spread of democracy, unilateralism, and promotion of the neoliberal economic model. This finding indicates that the two popular approaches to the phenomenon of anti-Americanism, which emphasize respectively irrational hostility to America and criticism the U.S. policies, can be reconciled as far as they focus on the different types of anti-American sentiments.
Second, a regression analysis showed that cultural and political anti-Americanism are differently related to socioeconomic development, measured by HDI. Specifically, cultural anti-Americanism is characterized by a quadratic relationship to HDI, so that the highest level of anti-American sentiments are observed in medium-developed societies. This was interpreted using the notion of ressentiment proposed by Greenfeld (1992) It's good that American ideas and customs are spreading here 1 0 It's bad that American ideas and customs are spreading here 2 1 Dislike American popular culture: "Which is closer to describing your view-I like American music, movies and television, OR I dislike American music, movies and television" (Question No.: Q30) I like American music, movies and television 1 0 I dislike American music, movies and television 2 1 View of the U.S. promotion of democracy as hypocritical: "And which comes closer to describing your view? The United States promotes democracy wherever it can, OR the United States promotes democracy mostly where it serves its interests?" (Question No.: Q34) The United States promotes democracy wherever it can 1 0 The United States promotes democracy mostly where it serves its interests 2 1
Note. Responses "Don't know" (dataset code 8) and "Refused" (dataset code 9) were treated as missing values 
